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Journalistic freedom and surveillance of journalists Post-Snowden 
 
It often takes an unexpected turn of events to reveal that we have 
entered a new paradigm. And so it seems with Edward Snowden, who, as 
a National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, was so appalled at the 
exponential expansion of covert digital surveillance that he decided it was 
his duty it was to inform the public and this he did from a hotel room in 
Hong Kong in June 2013. He gave a small group of selected journalists 
access to as many as 1.7m classified documents tsaken from his 
employer from NSA and detailing inner working of the Agency and its 
‘Five Eyes’ eavesdropping partners (ASIO in Australia, CSE in Canada, 
GCSB in New Zealand and the GCHQ in United Kingdom). Snowden’s 
documents revealed that the eavesdropping agencies can vacuum up just 
about all digital communications everywhere, anytime, and much else 
besides if they are so minded. Many who take a deep interest in 
intelligence thought western eavesdropping agencies had probably 
increased their capabilities since 9/11 but even they were shocked when 
Snowden revealed the sheer scale - which was exponentially greater than 
expected. As Wahl-Jorgeson et al explained it, the programmes revealed 
by Snowden ranged from the interception of data shared on the internet 
to practices of hacking into computer systems and compromising security 
levels.  
“They encompassed the bulk collection of everyone’s data as well as 
targeted surveillance of governments, companies and civil society 
organisations. Among other things, the revelations showed that the 
intelligence agencies had intercepted the metadata of billions of phone 
calls recorded by Verizon and other major phone companies. Through its 
PRISM programme, the NSA also accessed information gathered by 
Facebook, Google, Apple and other technology companies”. 
They observe that while there has always been state surveillance of parts 
of the population: 
“What is new is how, in our “datafied society” the gathering of extensive 
data about all of us is pervasive, opaque, yet central to the functioning of 
consumer capitalism.”(197). 
As Glenn Greenwald discovered from the documents the Five Eyes mantra 
is ‘Collect it all’. He quoted his favourite NSA document because of its 
clarity in terms of just how comprehensive collection is:  
“At the top of the document, it says ‘new collection posture’. This is the 
NSA describing its new collection position, and right underneath is a really 
ugly, though helpful, circle with six points on it. Each of the six points has 
a different phrase that elaborates on the ‘Collect It All’ mandate. So you 
go clockwise around the circle, and the top it says ‘Sniff It All’ and then it 
says ‘Knows It All,’ ‘Collect It All,’ ‘Process It All,’ ‘Exploit It All; and then 
the last one is ‘Partner it all.’  
This then is the institutional mandate for the NSA – it is collecting billions 
and billions of telephone calls and emails every single day from population 
and nations all over the world including our own” (Greenwald 2014). 
As we approach the fifth anniversary of Snowden’s revelations (June 
2018) there has now been time to take a measured assessment of the 
impact of Snowden’s controversial release. In the months immediately 
after Snowden’s document release (Sept 2013 – February 2014) I 
interviewed a number of journalists and journalism academics from across 
the Five Eyes countries about their reaction to the Snowden revelations 
(Lashmar 2016). The criteria were that these were all investigative 
journalists with national security reporting experience and therefore were 
likely to have a deep knowledge about what Snowden had meant for the 
wider public and for journalism. They are also likely to be the journalists 
most ’at risk’ by the surveillance capabilities of these agencies. As the 
general counsellor for Buzzzfeed, Nabiha Syed observed: “There has 
always been some information asymmetry between reporters acting in the 
public interest and powerful organizations – like government agencies – 
that possess critical information. Increasingly, that imbalance is tilting 
against the interest of two critical groups: national security reporters and 
independent journalists. Most surprising is the role of technology in 
exacerbating the asymmetry” (Bell et al 2017).  My interview cohort 
included reporters from both groups identified by Syed so I went back to 
those I had originally interviewed them where possible, interviewed them 
again. There had been some changes; one interviewee Gavin McFadyen of 
the UK’s Centre for Investigative Journalism had died, a sad loss. Back in 
2013 MacFadyean ominously asserted that, “The intelligence agencies’ 
capabilities are an incredible threat to us, our sources and democratic 
process. Knowledge is power and we give them all this knowledge without 
constraint with no fear of perjury.” He concludes sceptically: “These 
people lie all the time.” Others I had interviewed moved away from 
national security reporting and felt they had nothing new to add. I 
approached some 20 journalists and was able to interview twelve.  There 
are at least two reporters from each of the Five Eyes countries. They were 
Andrew Fowler (formerly Australia Broadcasting Corporation’s Four 
Corners programme) and Dylan Welch (ABC’s 7.30 show) from Australia, 
Jim Bronskill (Canada Press), Andrew Mitrovica (Freelance) David Seglins 
(CBC) for Canada, David Fisher (New Zealand Herald) and Nick Hager 
(freelance and NZ’s leading investigative reporter) for New Zealand, 
Duncan Campbell (intelligence expert and freelance journalist), Meirion 
Jones (ex-BBC and Bureau of Investigative Journalism) and Peter Taylor 
(BBC Panorama) in the UK and Scott Shane (New York Times) and Jeff 
Richelson (National Security Archive) in the US. All have have reported on 
intelligence agency excesses. At least three (Campbell, Hager, Fowler) 
have been subject to security agency raids as a result of their stories. All 
have reported on or used the Snowden documents. One had met 
Snowden (Taylor) and others worked with the Greenwald team to some 
extent. I used semi structured interviews. Occasionally in this chapter I 
quote academics and other journalists who have commented on key 
issues arising from Snowden. In addition I conducted a literature review 
of books, reports, chapters and papers on the impact of Snowden for 
journalists and their source (see Bell et al 2017, Fowler 2016, Kuehn 
2017, Bauman et al 2014; Moore 2014). There was also a timely UNESCO 
report published in May 2017 that surveys some 121 countries on the 
protection of sources in the digital age. In each company there had be 
reactions from media and civil society groups. Much of the concern has 
been about protecting sources. The author was part of group who advised 
on a study by the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (IALS) supported 
by The Guardian that said journalists find it increasingly difficult to 
safeguard the anonymity of their sources due to the monitoring and 
interception of online and phone conversations.  
“Working investigative journalists and media lawyers, many with several 
decades of experience, are profoundly concerned about the growing 
technological and legal vulnerability of confidential sources including 
whistle-blowers, the protection of whom is essential to the pursuit of 
responsible journalism in the public interest” (Townend and Danbury 
2017). 
It is worth noting none of those interviewed disputed that there is a role 
for intelligence agencies in tackling terrorism. Duncan Campbell took the 
view that ‘from available evidence’ British intelligence was doing a good 
job. Jim Bronskill said that in his own experience he had only ever heard 
a one reporter say that intelligence agencies should not exist. “There are 
very few people who say we should not have intelligence agencies or 
security apparatus. The consensus round that is: are they responsible, are 
they policed by proper legislation, proper oversight and review? And is the 
media reporting on them effectively?  
Perceptions of Snowden 
In the immediate aftermath of Snowden going public the former NSA and 
CIA employee was applauded by some as a hero but he was also accused 
of being a traitor and worse. The director of the NSA 2005-2014 General 
Keith B. Alexander stated that the Snowden leaks had resulted in "the 
greatest damage to our combined nations' intelligence systems that we 
have ever suffered" (MacAskill 2014). British intelligence has spoken of 
areas of the world having "gone dark" and of disruption caused to 
intelligence-gathering. Back in 2013 some commentators and journalists 
posited that he was working for Russian or Chinese intelligence. But that 
criticism seems to have receded and whether critics are for or against 
him, his sincerity is rarely now questioned. He remains in Russia and 
would face serious charges if he returned to the US. In 2015, Peter 
Taylor, one of the BBC’s most experienced current affairs journalists 
made a Panorama programme about surveillance. “I was fortunate 
enough to meet Edward Snowden in Moscow and spent about two hours 
with him. Before I met him, I was never quite sure about him. When I 
met him I was in no doubt about his sincerity, motivation and fierce 
determination to out there things he thought the public should know. He 
had a powerful feeling the public was being kept in the dark.”  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, as investigative journalists, all of the interviewees were 
in favour of Snowden and what he had done and felt that releasing 
information to the public was important. Some interviewees described 
Snowden as a hero (Mitrovica, Seglins). Andrew Mitrovica said, “We owe 
Snowdon a debt of gratitude for risking his safety and freedom”. Mitrovica 
said he was frustrated before Snowden that the public and editors were 
not taking surveillance seriously. But Snowden’s leaks changed that. “The 
public imagination caught up in what he was doing. I thank him for trying 
to help make these things know the public. Snowden liberated people to 
say the public have a right to see this.” The name Snowden, it seems, has 
also become a form of adjective, a shorthand to refer to global mass 
surveillance. 
Impact of Snowden 
Indeed most of the interviewees felt the Snowden’s revelations had 
reached a global audience and that in terms of considering privacy and 
surveillance there is a before and after Snowden. David Fisher said, “In 
the intelligence and the security space there is far greater awareness of 
surveillance issues and privacy issues.” He believes that the public, least 
in New Zealand now has no expectation of privacy. Referring to the Five 
Eyes eavesdropping agencies he stated: “Snowden has contextualised 
what we are dealing with now. The power they have, if they choose to use 
it, is awesome”. 
Asked what the impact of his revelations was the responses from those 
interviewed were varied. Peter Taylor felt that what Snowden done was 
“hugely important”. Mitrovica felt the releases had had a huge impact on 
the public and “made what was going on clear.” Scott Shane said 
Snowden had raised awareness. Shane said that he had published an 
explanatory series on the NSA in 1995 and at that point very few 
Americans had any idea what the agency was. Snowden, he said, had 
“certainly greatly raised the awareness of Americans that there is a big 
intelligence agency that intercepts a whole lot of information and 
intercepts a whole lot of communication and there are privacy issues that 
are implicated.” The US interviewees reported a more mixed reaction 
from the US public. He noted that in response to the Snowden 
revelations: “About half of Americans and about half of Congress were 
unhappy with some of what was exposed primarily the phone call 
metadata and the Obama administration and Congress scaled things back 
and changed the procedure to increase privacy protection for Americans 
and made it less possible for the Government to collect and store data on 
millions of Americans”. He says that NSA is so powerful that it needs to 
be closely monitored. “The capabilities of NSA obviously are so 
consequential that everybody needs to keep a close track.” 
Duncan Campbell who is the UK journalism’s leading expert on Signals 
Intelligence (Sigint) was very measured when I interviewed him back in 
2014 but said he was surprised at the scale of the surveillance capability 
revealed by the documents. As is always the case Campbell’s 
interpretation remains nuanced and was more cautious about the overall 
impact overall when interviewed again in 2017. The scholarly Jeff 
Richelson, who is one of the leading experts on Sigint, in the US said he 
the vastness of the Five Eyes operation did surprise him. The documents, 
he said “dramatically shifted the understanding of the nature of Sigint 
effort both by the US and the British in terms both of the reach of it but 
also in terms of targeting digital networks and extracting intelligence from 
digital networks and the lengths they went to and had gone to and 
presumably going to get that information terms of not simply basic 
hacking or passive intercept but also implants or planting devices in 
computers they have diverted“. What the impact on the public had been 
he did not feel very qualified to comment. The UK’s Meirion Jones, known 
for his fearless journalism, was the most sceptical of the interviewees 
about the impact and felt the revelations merely confirmed what the 
public and journalists had suspected.  
Canada’s Dave Seglins, who is an experienced CBC broadcaster on the 
national security beat said of what Snowden revealed “I was shocked at 
the initial stories” but he felt that Canadians were less sceptical than 
Americans over the authorities: “Canadians were far more complacent. In 
my view, and far less disturbed for their privacy.” Fellow Canadian 
Andrew Mitrovica who has investigated a number of intelligence scandal 
and is a leading Canadian critic of the intelligence agencies, struck a 
slightly different note, observing that there had been public 
demonstrations in the streets after Snowden’s leaks. He felt Snowden had 
become a major cultural figure in the world. Jim Bronskill agreed that 
Snowden had reset the public debate. “It was useful and still is in the 
sense people are more mindful of the fact there are agencies collecting 
intelligence and with modern tools it is infinitely easier to do and it is 
happening.” 
Nicky Hager, who has had a number of run ins with intelligence agencies 
in New Zealnd over his investigations, stated that the Snowden 
revelations were ‘absolutely incredible’ and felt ‘there had been a high 
level of public support for Snowden’. He commented, “The New Zealand 
public at large had a much larger reaction to the overall world news than 
stories about New Zealand. David Fisher and Hager both said there was 
initially, a big reaction in New Zealand with town hall meetings and public 
demonstrations in the months after Snowden’s leaks. Dylan Welch who 
took over national security reporting for ABC’s 7.30 prtogramme when he 
returned from Afghanistan, said that for a decade after 9/11 there was a 
public willingness to take the National Security sector at its word. “There 
is now something of a pushback.” Author of “The War on Journalism” 
(2015), Andrew Fowler said the Australian reaction was divided. The 
public, he observed “have been, I would say quite supportive, in the 
sense that they have always believed there communications were being 
interfered with and their data might not be safe but this provided absolute 
proof of it.” Fowler and Dylan Welch felt that the Australian public did not 
react strongly as they are very conservative in their views when it comes 
to intelligence issues.  In the UK Meirion Jones said the public reaction 
was mixed, but believes that if anything, the revelations resulted in 
sizeable part of the UK public having increased pride in the intelligence 
services. “That British intelligence is still something important, that they 
are ranked up there with the Americans, dirtier than the Americans, it 
appeals to a James Bond aura, for them it wasn’t negative.” Campbell 
picking up on Hager’s point noted it is segmented reaction among the 
public with technological aware people expressing concern and “a large 
number of people not touched” not relevant to them small minority and 
informed group of people who are favour of the scale of these operations.  
One of the most interesting aspects of the UK reaction is that at time 
Guardian was publishing Snowden documents, much of the UK Press 
turned on the Guardian for printing Snowden documents and sided with 
the government and intelligence communities’ condemnation particularly 
The Telegraph, The Sun and the Daily Mail. Broadcast news was slow to 
pick up the story another point that will be picked up below. Campbell 
says that coverage of Snowden in the UK was: “Highly slanted and quite 
significant in that the voice of Snowden was muted so the message was 
only be really only conveyed by The Guardian and yes, the BBC, but 
muted through the onerous processes of purported balance.” Also critical 
of Press coverage was a report by Cardiff University journalism 
department academics that had carried out a two year research project 
(2014-16) on the impact of Snowden - Digital Citizenship and the 
Surveillance Society, who accused the Press of a quasi-legitimation of the 
surveillance debate in the newspaper coverage and that it normalised 
surveillance. “Furthermore, the newspapers’ heavy reliance on politicians 
as sources has meant that the surveillance debate was mainly centered 
around the impact surveillance had on the political arena rather than what 
it actually meant for the wider public. (Cable 2017) 
In the other Five Eyes countries there was much less of a tendency for 
the other news media to turn on the news organisations that had 
published exclusive Snowden material. When the Snowden material was 
published politicians and intelligence chiefs attacked journalists for 
publishing the material and it was not uncommon for them to accuse 
editors of putting lives in danger and damaging the ability of national 
security agencies to monitor and deter terrorists. 
Watergate? 
I asked interviewees how they would measure Snowden as a paradigmatic 
event.  I asked for instance, how they would compare it with Watergate 
perhaps the most recognised issue where the news media had clashed 
with the secret state. Canada’s Dave Seglins and Andrew Mitrovica both 
felt the Snowden affair was of global significance. Seglins stated, 
“Snowden was more important than Watergate. Watergate perceived the 
veneer of moral leadership in the US but had less of impact on the 
citizens of the world. I think the Snowden revelations instantly ripped the 
shroud of secrecy from activities of the Five Eyes countries but also made 
the entire world aware, realise of what was technologically capable, 
possible. So I think it has far reaching consequences for people around 
the world and just in the Five Eyes countries.” 
It was interesting that the news narrative over Snowden often 
concentrated on Snowden’s personality and little was said about the fact 
that the ‘Five Eyes’ lax security had enabled a contractor to downloaded 
to download a massive tranche of classified intelligence documents. 
Virtually no report at the time discussed the possibility that if Snowden 
could do it who else could access the material who might be motivated by 
greed or ideology but was not interested in going public and may well 
have been a spy. It is worth noting that the Chinese security forces killed 
or imprisoned as many as twenty CIA agents in China from 2010-12 and 
that looks like a mole or data leak (Mazzetti et al 2017). 
It was not just activists and journalist who are concerned about the scale 
of surveillance. The Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights unanimously adopted a Resolution, and a 
Recommendation, on January 26th 2015. The Resolution included the 
following statements:  
“The Parliamentary Assembly is deeply concerned about mass surveillance 
practices disclosed since June 2013 by journalists to whom a former US 
national security insider, Mr. Edward Snowden, had entrusted a large 
amount of top secret data establishing the existence of mass surveillance 
and large-scale intrusion practices hitherto unknown to the general public 
and even to most political decision-makers.” (UNESCO 2017) 
The UNESCO researchers also raised concerns over the practice of 
‘outsourcing’ the interception of citizens’ communications to allied 
countries’ national security agencies, in order to avoid domestic privacy 
and freedom of expression laws, may heighten the risks for journalistic 
source protection. 
The collection obsession 
Duncan Campbell felt that Snowden coverage has been too focussed on 
bulk collection and too little has been said about what GCHQ did with the 
data it collected. Campbell pointed out GCHQ has ‘customers’. “It’s a 
business, that’s its raison d’etre” He notes it has customer relations 
teams, a sales force and delivery drivers” - and for all the reporting of 
GCHQ’s role “it only focusses on one aspect - collection - the systems that 
steal all our data.” 
“It doesn’t look at the intelligence process in the round, because for the 
most part that is what these documents see, and generally when they did, 
with some salient exceptions, that is not what the journalists went for. It 
seemed sexy to describe massive scoops on internet cables and the 
factors of scale, which is truly astonishing and so on. That criticism can 
probably be made of me,” he continued. 
“The fact of the matter is to understand in its context and the harm or 
good that may be done by signal intelligence agencies you have to look at 
the tasking, the collection management, the analysis process and above 
all the consumer reporting channel because the core interactions are not 
collection directed against the citizen, or the business or the target. They 
are the customer - who the government pays - customer gets spy data – 
what spy data? Then the second interaction that matters is, - what is 
done with it?  So if the Snowden documents, which they do on some 
occasions, speak to all of those processes, they clearly have more force 
and show more of the picture and when they don’t, they certainly show 
collection capability and scale. But what is done with it?” 
Campbell made the point it is important as to who gets the information 
from GCHQ information - whether it is  the Defence Intelligence (DI), 
MI6, MI5 or the police and what they do with it and whether it infringes 
the target’s rights under Article 8. 
Indeed the intelligence lobby was frustrated by this post-Snowden 
emphasis on collection, which they describe as bulk collection and argue 
that is not the same as mass surveillance as they filter out most data to 
focus on targets set by their customers and do not eavesdrop on the 
public at large. However we have little idea how collected data impacts on 
the civil liberties of ‘targets’. In each of the Five Eyes countries there have 
been historical and recent examples of intelligence and security forces 
excesses. In the United States in the wake of 9/11 there was mass 
telephone interception of US citizens which, while approved by President 
Bush was illegal and not revealed until 2006. This was followed by 
examples of rendition and torture. In the UK the British Special Branch 
ran an undercover operation the “Special Demonstration Squad” for 
twenty years in which police officers infiltrated activist groups and had 
relationships and children with activists before ‘disappearing’. And there 
have been similar events in other Five Eyes countries. 
Impact on Journalists  
As UNESCO has observed: “While the rapidly emerging digital 
environment offers great opportunities for journalists to investigate and 
report information in the public interest, it also poses particular 
challenges regarding the privacy and safety of journalistic sources.” 
The Snowden showed that journalists were the targets of intelligence. In 
2013, Der Spiegel reported that the NSA had intercepted, read and 
analysed internal communications at Al Jazeera which had been encrypted 
by the news organisation (Der Spiegel 2013). In early 2015 The Guardian 
published a Snowden document that revealed that a UK Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) information security assessment 
listed “investigative journalists” in a threat hierarchy (Ball 2015).  
A clear case of undercutting of confidential source protection by mass 
surveillance came in July 2015, in a German parliamentary investigation 
into the surveillance of German citizens in 2011. During the course of 
questioning, a German intelligence chief revealed that Der Spiegel 
journalists had also been under surveillance and that an official from the 
service of an ally had revealed the identity of one of the journalists’ 
confidential sources to the German government (Tapper 2015). 
Documents linked to Edward Snowden, published by The Guardian in 
2015, posited that the UK’s GCHQ (Government Communications 
Headquarters) had syphoned emails from some of the world’s top news 
organisations – the BBC, The Guardian, Le Monde, Reuters, The New York 
Times and The Washington Post among them – for internal distribution 
(Ball 2015) Unesco 
UNESCO researchers noted that the current digital environment poses 
particular challenges to traditional legal protections for journalists’ 
sources. While protective laws and/or a reporter’s commitment shielded 
the identity of sources in the analogue past, in the age of digital 
reporting, mass surveillance, mandatory data retention, and disclosure by 
third party intermediaries, this traditional shield can be penetrated 
(UNESCO 2017). 
Nearly all interviewees felt that Snowden had a big impact on journalists 
generally and had raised very serious questions about whether journalist 
could protect their sources.  Shane said “There was more awareness 
amongst journalists”. Mitrovica was bullish, “It’s not had a chilling effect 
on me”. Nor was he worried about the impact on sources: “I think some 
sources have been emboldened by Snowden”. Back in 2014 Duncan 
Campbell counselled it was important to keep things in perspective and 
only a relatively small number of journalists are likely to run up against 
surveillance by the NSA network:  
“The impact of Snowden’s revelations should not really be overstated for 
journalism, because the most critical aspect relates to the conduct of the 
intelligence (Lashmar 2016). 
Campbell maintained this position. New Zealand’s David Fisher observed 
much the same for most investigations but stated it is a different story if 
you are investigating Five Eyes agencies. ”If you are fucking with them 
there is no way they are not going to find out.” Otherwise sensible trade 
craft will do, he said. “If it’s the spies you are messing with - they are 
going to track single every bit of metadata you’ve got. They are going to 
intercept every bit of commination you got. When you are out of house 
they will be break in and download everything on your computers”. Jones 
took a similar position but added – “If you do come to their attention they 
will be all over you. There is no possibility you can protect yourself.” 
The issue of source protection has come to intersect with the issues of 
mass surveillance, targeted surveillance, data retention, the spill-over 
effects of antiterrorism/national security legislation, and the role of third 
party Internet companies known as “intermediaries” (UNESCO 2017) 
As the UNESCO pointed out there is a globally established ethical 
obligation upon journalists to avoid revealing the identity of their 
confidential sources. In some cases, it is also a legal right, or even a legal 
requirement. In Sweden, protection of confidential sources is so strong 
that journalists can be prosecuted for revealing their identities (Hendler 
2010). However, in many cases, the legal situation does not grant 
recognition of such confidentiality and journalists can still be legally 
compelled to identify their sources or face penalties, prosecution and 
imprisonment. (UNESCO) 
In February 2015, the Pew Research Center released the results of a 
survey on “Perceptions of vulnerability and changes in behaviour” among 
members of the USA-based organisation Investigative Reporters and 
Editors (Holcomb, Mitchell & Page 2015). Pew’s research found that 64% 
of investigative journalists surveyed believed that the US Government 
collected data about their communications. The figure rose to 71% among 
national political reporters and those who report foreign affairs and 
national security issues. Ninety percent of the of US investigative 
journalists who responded to the Pew survey believed that their ISP would 
routinely share their data with the NSA, while more than 70% reported 
that they had little confidence in ISPs’ ability to protect their 
data.(UNESCO and Pew) 
Impact on Sources 
David Fisher stated that sources are more alert “There has been a chilling 
effect.” Taylor said he thought Snowden had had a chilling effect on 
sources. Meirion Jones said it had impacted on sourcesShane reported it 
had an impact on sources but this had been somewhat negated by Trump 
where sources are queuing up to dish the dirt on the White House. Fowler 
was concerned how cavalier some sources had been and that he still gets 
emails that could incriminate the sender. 
ICIJ’s Ryle told UNESCO researchers said there is certainly increasing 
awareness among his sources that the stakes are much higher in the age 
of surveillance: “People are increasingly nervous because the truth is it’s 
quite easy to trace people and to trace sources”.  
The Pew study found that 45% of respondents ranked surveillance as the 
number one or number two challenge facing journalists (Holcomb, Mitchell 
& Page 2015). Nearly half of the national security, political and foreign 
affairs reporters among them also reported that concerns about 
surveillance have caused them to change the ways in which they 
communicated with sources (with reverting to face-to-face meetings 
being the main means of protecting sources). Meanwhile, 18 percent of 
this group reported that it was becoming harder to get sources to speak 
“off record” (UNESCO 2017). 
Methods 
UNESCO researchers noted that across the 121 countries it surveyed 
many journalists are now significantly changing their methods in an effort 
to shield their sources from exposure, sometimes even seeking to avoid 
electronic devices and communications altogether.  
“Regardless, such tactics may be insufficient if legal protections are weak, 
anonymity is forbidden, encryption is disallowed, and sources themselves 
are unaware of the risks. The impact of these combined factors on the 
production and scope of investigative journalism based on confidential 
sources is significant.”  
Unesco noted that where source protection is compromised, the impacts 
can include:  
• Pre-publication exposure of journalistic investigations which may trigger 
cover-ups, intimidation, or destruction of information, 
• Revelation of sources’ identities with legal or extra-legal repercussions 
on them,  
• Sources of information running dry,  
• Self-censorship by journalists and citizens more broadly. (UNESCO 
2017)  
Again with the interviewees the reaction to changing procedures was 
mixed. Some interviewees (Fowler, Welch, Seglins, Fisher, Shane) said 
they had tightened up their security since Snowden to protect their 
sources. Shane said he had become more cautious but made the point 
that in the US it was not just the Snowden revelations that influenced 
journalists but the Obama administrations prosecution of journalist 
sources that had impacted on journalists. Indeed one of Shane’s own 
sources John Kirakou had been prosecuted and jailed. 
David Seglins said that working with the Snowden documents had 
“Fundamentally changed my understanding of operational security as a 
journalist. Everything from storage of documents to the use of encryption, 
encrypted communication, encrypted data storage. To how our mobile 
devices are potential listening devices and how that affects a journalist’s 
ability travel to places, meet sources, have discussions with absolute 
certainty we are not being recorded or monitored or tracked.” 
Others (Hager and Jones) said that they had always employed rigorous 
source methods and have maintained sources so had no plans to change. 
”I would rather lose a story than a source,” said Jones. Some 
interviewees have incorporated new counter surveillance digital methods 
routinely into their work. Encryption has become a regular tool in a way it 
was not before Snowden. Shane said he uses encrypted email. Some are 
using PGP (Fowler, Welch, Seglins, Fisher, Jones, Shane) as necessary 
and some use TOR (Seglins, Jones). Some also use encrypted phone apps 
like Signal. “One of the things that has changed since we last talked is the 
proliferation of encryption communication apps. Many of have run through 
the various one, Silent Circle, What’s Apps, Signal, so there is an 
increasing availability of encrypted communications. I’m certainly more 
aware of what I am putting into a storable electronic record.” 
It is worth noting that some of the interviewees now include the PGP key 
into their email or social media addresses.  Welch said this told potential 
sources that they were serious about source protection “I list it all I tell 
people where they can find my PGP, my public key. I tell I have every 
single one of the encrypted apps on my phone. I use them a lot. I don’t 
try to hide it”. Some reported their organisations had decided to set up 
Secure Drop (secure and encrypted dropbox type) facilities for potential 
sources to send material to (This includes SMH, CBC, NYT, BIJ) other 
organisations have decided against it (ABC in Australia, New Zealand 
Herald, Canada News). Fisher pointed out that using encryption can ‘red 
flag’ to interested intelligence agencies that you are communicating with 
someone they might be interested in. Most journalists who use encryption 
said it was only a partial solution to be used with care. There was clear 
concern that the Five Eyes may have found ways to break encryption. 
Taylor said that while examining the Snowden documents: “One thing 
that really surprised me, and really it should not have done, was that he 
had a GCHQ material from a training manual. The intelligence service 
GCHQ could tap into your phone by planting malware inside it and listen 
to your conversations and take photos of you and whoever you were with, 
even though your phone appeared to be off. That really shook me.” 
Scott Shane said that NYT had appointed a newsroom security adviser 
and journalists there were given training and advice from lawyers. Almost 
all interviewees emphasised the importance of non-digital means of 
communication with sources. This was to meet sources making sure there 
was digital footprint of the meeting – leaving mobile phones and laptops 
at home. Jones said it was important to tell sources that you cannot 
guarantee to protect them, though you would do your best.  
Chilling Effect 
Cardiff University’s carried out a two year research project on the impact 
of Snowden - Digital Citizenship and the ‘Surveillance Society. Among 
their conclusions they noted a chilling effect:  
“Most importantly, however, the findings point to a chilling effect on 
journalism: with increased surveillance of digital communications, 
journalists’ sources may over time become more reluctant to 
communicate wrongdoing when faced with the prospect of being exposed 
by surveillance mechanisms and techniques” (Cable 2016). 
All interviewees were concerned about the chilling effect of surveillance on 
journalists, sources and the public. Dave Seglins said that there was a 
chilling. “Generally speaking people have changed their behaviour 
because we are more cognisant of what is possible in terms of being 
monitored. For instance the discussions that comes from our sources 
using SecureDrop. They expressly state they would never dream of 
sending a normal email.” 
“So it’s hard to measure the chilling effect on our sources but I think it 
has had a chilling effect on everybody in terms of this notion that 
electronic communications are completely private. We would like to think 
they are private. We try to operate as though they are, but we know 
better.” 
Nicky Hager stated: “I fear it has the chilling effect on people’s lives which 
us people who care about privacy and civil rights and the impact 
intelligence, is our worst fear - that people restrict their lives and make 
different decisions and feel differently about themselves, about their 
secrets, and hopes and things and they grow differently as person 
because they have background sense of the lack of privacy.” 
Hager felt that journalists have to report on intelligence and its excesses. 
But he worried about being part of the chilling effect. “I know, on the one 
hand, that unless we publicise and debate and kind of have real 
information rather than just vague fears there can be no real progress. 
But Ion the other hand to publicise is to add to this chilling effect and I 
worry about. I think it is a really important issue.” 
In Australia Fowler thought Snowden’s revelations had a “Definite chilling 
effect on the way people’s behaviour.  If it has changed my behaviour, it 
will have certainly changed the behaviour of people I would normally talk 
to.” 
“The other effect is on the leakers and the idea of chilling them - it chills 
the low level stuff - but what it does not stop the people like Snowden 
and Manning because the idea of locking someone up for 35 years was 
supposed to chilling effect on everybody but then up pops Snowden.”  
Damage to national security 
Interviewees were again varied in their response as to whether Snowden 
had damaged national security. Campbell thought there might have been 
an impact on operational effectiveness. Richelson thought some 
techniques may have been revealed. After British intelligence claimed to 
him that Snowden had put lives in danger, Taylor asked them to identify 
an example. They failed to do so saying “we can’t comment on such 
information”. He does feel that there was some general damage but 
Snowden also performed a public service. Always robust in his position, 
Fisher in New Zealand took the view that claims of damage were “load of 
bollocks”. If there had been any real consequences of that occurring that 
would have been rammed down all of our throats”. Fowler in Australia did 
not believe there had been in damage. Neither did Mitrovica in Canada: 
“No it’s a myth, it hasn’t damaged their effectiveness. They always trot 
this out all the time.”   
Seglins noted that if Canadians were to have confidence in their national 
security: “Part of National security is confidence in democracy, confidence 
in judicial oversight, confidence in our law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies. And if they were operating in the dark, and/or illegally, and/or 
counter to public trust, then I would say the Snowden leaks have 
enhanced national security because we were growing for a long time in 
the dark not knowing what our law enforcement agencies were up to. And 
that secrecy and that vacuum of public knowledge and oversight are 
where corruptions and break downs occur, we know that.” 
One of the major complaints from politicians and intelligence chiefs is that 
Snowden’s revelations is that are not only journalists, sources and the 
public much more likely to use encryption but so are criminals and 
terrorist. Agencies complain that some of their key targets’ have gone 
dark’ because of encryption. Taylor stated that “Remember Snowden was 
in early days of encryption. Encryption is now the big problem.” Indeed 
Snowden has publicly supported people using encryption. 
Responsibility of the media. 
Andrew Fowler noted that: “Journalists do not want to create a less safe 
world. Our job is to make the world a safer and better place for our kids 
and us to live in. And we do not want to compromise national security.” 
So far only less than ten thousand of Snowden’s documents, carefully 
controlled by a team of journalists led by Glenn Greenwald and Laura 
Poitras, have been released into the public domain through a set of rigid 
procedures. All the interviewees thought the media that had dealt with 
the Snowden material had acted responsibly. Taylor thought the Guardian 
had been professional as the first news organisation to publish Snowden 
documents. Those who had used documents had checked with formal 
intelligence contacts to make sure that they were not going to do any 
inadvertent damage. In some extensive and repeated checks were made 
and in some case aspects of stories were dropped if the news organisation 
thought the national security people had made a case. Rusbridger has 
said the Guardian had over 100 contacts with the authorities before 
publication. Shane, Taylor and Seglins reported detailed conversations.  
Redaction was also used. Journalists (Taylor, Shane, Seglins) who dealt in 
these negotiations were critical of the initial position of intelligence chiefs 
which was to say nothing should be published. Over a period of time the 
negotiations became more sensible and the intelligence agencies realised 
that the journalist were more likely to listen if the made a good case for 
an element not being published. Hager said there were aspects of New 
Zealand surveillance in Bangladesh that they had withheld. Taylor said 
that despite the hard line initially taken by the intelligence chiefs that the 
BBC should not broadcast Snowden documents, that after the Panorama 
programme went out they seemed to think it was fair.  
Fowler stated he did not think that journalists should refer back to the 
agencies: “I do think they acted responsibility. In fact my argument is 
that I think the journalists acted, what I would call, without being too 
cute, too responsibly. I would trust the judgement of a journalist whether 
or not to publish the material  rather than running it pass Government as 
seems to have been case with the Snowden documents…..I don’t think a 
journalist should need to do that make a call on that and live with that”  
Public service broadcasters were seen to be slow on the uptake to tackle 
the Snowden story and left it to be reported just as news and that it has 
to be said was very low key from the security correspondents. Meirion 
Jones was then at Panorama and spent many months negotiating to take 
the US Sigint expert James Bamford to meet with Snowden for a 
programme but senior management failed to approve it. It was not until 
many months later that Peter Taylor made his Panorama on Snowden 
(Oct 2015). There was accusation of CBC ‘dragging its heels’ before 
Seglins started producing stories working with the Greenwald team in 
2015. 
One of the consequences of the Snowden affair is that intelligence 
agencies in the Five Eyes countries have become more responsive to the 
public and the media. Hager said that as the smallest agency in the pact 
the GSCB lacked the self-confidence to talk to the media. David  Fisher 
said that it published the intelligence services communication plan which 
was leaked to him and it made clear that the old all purpose ‘neither 
confirm nor deny” reply would not was any more.  
“It makes New Zealand the second of the Five Eyes nations to make the 
information available to its citizens, following the United States' 
declassification of its version of the document "US SID18". The release of 
the US document followed Barack Obama's instruction to the NSA to 
release details of its electronic eavesdropping safeguards a year ago in 
response to Edward Snowden's NSA leaks. (Fisher 2014) 
Hager was more sceptical about any opening up. “There wasn’t a 
discussion. The most frustrating thing about intelligence as a public policy 
issue, or as part of the life of the country which it was plainly is, is that 
there is a sense of entitlement of the side of the authorities not to engage 
win debate, and they know perfectly well that while that has an 
operational element it is also highly convenient.” 
Shane said there may have been some damage to specific operations, but 
that was the price of democratic debate, “If you live inside those 
bureaucracies you begin to think that it’s the end of the world when 
someone learns something about what you up to. But these trade-offs 
exist in any democracy. We would be all safer from terrorism is there was 
not restrictions on these agencies and they recorded and stored every all 
American’s conversation and emails on a permanent basis. We would all 
be safe from terrorism. On the other hand that’s not the way we want to 
live and I think these agencies sometimes forget that. ” 
The UK agencies are still retentive and the GCHQ does not really talk to 
the media about its work except to a handful of trusted reporters. Taylor 
said he understood why up to a point but it would benefit by a more 
approach: “I think that is there was degree of greater flexibility, 
journalists would benefit and by dint of that, so would the public. But is 
has to be circumscribed.” 
Laws. 
Interviewees in all countries said new laws have been passed to enhance 
the power and scope of the intelligence agencies. In some case the laws 
were on their way already at the time of Snowden releasing the 
documents and in other cases the Snowden affair was either part of all of 
the reason for new laws. Nearly all the interviewees felt that the laws 
gave excessive power to the national security community. In some cases 
they took the view the laws were draconian. In the UK as a result of the 
Snowden revelations, in February 2015, the intelligence watchdog, the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) found GCHQ had breached human 
rights conventions in relation to the UK’s access to the NSA’s bulk data 
collection program Investigatory Powers Act the tougher and revised 
successor to the ‘Snooper’s Charter’ passed into law in 2016. Taylor said 
of the “The difference that Snowden has made is that we now have 
legislation that is far more embracing than its predecessor”. As the Act 
passed into law Snowden tweeted: “The UK has just legalised the most 
extreme surveillance in the history of western democracy.” In July 2014, 
the UK government fast-tracked a new Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act as ‘emergency legislation’ and rushed it through parliament in 
a single day. The Act was designed to revise UK data retention law in 
response to an April 2014 ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
invalidating the 2009 Data Retention Directive. The law not only provides 
for ongoing blanket retention of communications data of UK residents, in 
direct contradiction with the ECJ ruling, it also extends the reach of UK 
interception powers by enabling the government to require companies 
based outside of the United Kingdom to comply with the UK’s warrants. In 
addition the UK’s Law Commission has carried out for the Government a 
consultation to update the Official Secrets Act into an Espionage Act which 
critics say the initial proposals suggest that journalists, sources and 
whistle-blowers will be vulnerable to imprisonment. 
Some interviewees felt the Snowden leaks had given government the 
justification to toughen the laws. Fisher said that new legislation were in 
2014 in New Zealand and there were protest is but when more ‘enhanced’ 
legislation was passed in 2017 there were no protests. Some interviewees 
noted that these laws made no or little provision for journalists 
undertaking their fourth estate role. For Australia, Fowler stated “The 
Government has introduced tough new laws as a result of Snowden citing 
Snowden as one of the reasons why they had introduced them.” 
As critics have noted the initial draft of Australia’s metadata legislation 
arrived without a dataset or safeguards. A review by the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) added 39 
recommendations, including a request for a separate review on the 
impacts on journalists, the inclusion of a dataset and additional oversight 
provisions. A mandatory two year metadata-retention scheme was among 
the many anti-terrorism measures.  In Australia the justification for need 
for the new legislation was set at the door of the so-called Islamic States 
not the Snowden revelations. In both Australia and UK there have been 
examples of police and using existing legislation (RIPA in the UK and 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 in Austrialia.in 
secret to identify sources by accessing journalists’ metadata.  
Mitrovica said the Canadian government had enacted as ‘draconian pieces 
of “anti-terrorism” legalisation’ including anti-terrorism law C51. “C51 
broadens state powers to surveil individuals broadens what is considered 
dissent.” He added:  “It’s not surprising government inevitably act this 
way”. Seglins said that the Trudeau government has conducted a review 
and it is likely that it will include enhanced judicial oversight of the 
Canadian intelligence agencies. Canadian Law professor and author Lisa 
Austin argued a serious rule-of-law problem exists post-Snowden. Austin 
notes that whilst legal pathways exist for state surveillance, the absence 
of oversight and accountability demanded by the rule-of-law has created 
a situation she describes as “lawful illegality.” In Canada the courts have 
ordered a Vice reporter to hand over documents or he faces jail. 
Vice journalist Ben Makuch has been fighting a police order to hand over 
his correspondence with Farah Mohamed Shirdon — a man who left 
Calgary to allegedly fight with ISIS. Makuch refuses and it is still in the 
court process at the time of writing (Austin 2016).  
The USA Freedom Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives 
in May 2015, reduces government bulk collection of US phone records. 
Americans’ phone records will still be hoovered up – but now by the 
telephone companies, not the NSA – and access to them will require a 
warranting process. And elements of transparency around government 
surveillance and the operations of the secret FISA court will be 
introduced. 
Privacy International’s Tomaso Falchetta, has highlighted a major problem 
with regard to the impact of anti-terrorism and national security 
legislation on journalistic source protection: …Most laws regulating 
interception and surveillance do not specifically recognise additional rights 
for journalists. This is particularly so with regards to counter-terrorism 
legislation that provides for expansive powers of state surveillance 
without making provisions for protection of journalists’ sources. 
Traditional national security laws and new counter-terrorism laws adopted 
in numerous countries give authorities extensive powers to demand 
assistance from journalists, intercept communications, and gather 
information. (Falchetta 2015)(UNESCO 2017) 
Conclusions 
Snowden revealed that we had sleepwalked into a world where total 
digital surveillance was not only possible but was happening. What the 
interviewees just about all agreed was that Snowden had reset the public 
discussion for better or worse. As Taylor, Hager and others pointed out 
this had closed down after 9/11. Taylor thought Snowden was ‘hugely 
important. “It was of its time because secrecy had always been an issue 
but at that particular time it had reached a head and that again is one of 
the reasons why Snowden revealed it…..He was genuinely shocked”. They 
felt that the changes in agencies powers and capabilities were so great it 
needed to be referred back to the public even if was for affirmation. 
Hager’s point resonates with Campbell and others concerns that the Sigint 
agencies were they focus on expanding the technology to ‘collect it all’ 
and whether this was the best means of deterring terrorism with what is a 
very large but finite budget. In the UK and Europe terrorism plots are 
stopped but there is a rise in the number of successful ‘home grown’ 
attacks. 
The digital world has had many benefits for journalists in terms of 
effective research and also the bonus of massive leaks of information 
such WikiLeaks, Snowden, Panama Papers and many other dumps of 
offshore company information revealing how many politicians have secret 
bank accounts. While the United States is by far the dominant partner of 
the Five Eyes partnership it has been the most willing to listen to concern 
over the powers of intelligence. Some laws have been reduced. In 
Australia and New Zealand new laws to facilitate surveillance have been 
passed with little public debate. It is also clear that all five governments 
whatever they said in public had little respect for journalists’ fourth estate 
role and were happy to propose laws that would make the job of 
journalists even harder. 
The UK response to Snowden is that government, intelligence chiefs and 
even some editors took the approach to those who were concerned about 
Snowden’s revelations: “Move along please, there is nothing to see”. It 
was a monumental arrogance to decide the public and critical news media 
should not have the right to discuss such a major political change as the 
development of an infrastructure capable of total surveillance. Dressing it 
up as a necessary response to terrorism was and is just not good enough. 
Far from there being ‘nothing to see’ we have moved into a different type 
of society. The intelligence lobby are playing a ‘dead bat’ to the critical 
audience but behind the scenes they have moved to lobbying for further 
powers and capabilities. As UNESCO researchers noted: “The problem has 
grown in the intervening years, as a parallel to digital development, and 
occurs where it is un-checked by measures designed to preserve 
fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy, as well as 
accountability and transparency. In practice, this leads to what can be 
identified as a ‘trumping effect’, where national security and antiterrorism 
legislation effectively take precedence over legal and normative 
protections for confidential journalistic sources”. 
That the government and intelligence lobby do not even want to debate 
compelling evidence that we have moved into a digital surveillance state 
is not evidence of a strong democratic government at work but in the 
contrary, a victory for terrorists. To have so fundamentally changed the 
nature of a society, to have made it so fearful, is a win for terrorist and a 
defeat for a democratic state. That governments have become more 
authoritarian is also demonstrated by the failure to make provision for 
journalists doing their fourth estate job, supposedly a vital independent 
oversight mechanism in a democracy. There is a clear drive to close down 
journalistic public interest endeavour especially for investigating the 
secret state. This is not just an issue for the Five Eyes countries but sets 
the tone for other countries many of which are following suit as the 
UNESCO report clearly shows. We can blame Snowden but he did not set 
up the Five Eyes, he was the messenger not the architect. 
Perhaps the most telling comment from the interviews that demonstrates 
the new paradigm was from Nicky Hager that the impact of global 
surveillance may have on the citizen’s behaviour and because of this 
“they grow differently as person because they have background sense of 
the lack of privacy”. Privacy is a fundamental human condition and we do 
not know yet the consequences of undermining the public’s fundamental 
sense of privacy. This can be laid not only at the feet of Five Eyes but also 
of the internet giants like Google and Facebook but the national security 
involvement brings a totalitarian tone to the debate. If intelligence and 
surveillance are impacting negatively on ordinary people’s lives then we 
need to stop and debate this, not as the UK government did and tried to 
ignore any dissent. What follows on from ignoring dissent is the 
suppression of dissenters and the tools are now in place to do exactly 
that. 
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